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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING

Appellant is unaware of any parties other than those
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IV.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from the trial court's order denying
Appellant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah's ("Blue Cross" or
"Defendant") motion to compel arbitration.

Jurisdiction is

granted under Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-31a-19(l).
V,

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Issues

Blue Cross raises the following issues on appeal.
The issue before the Court is whether the McCoys' insurance
policy was validly amended to include an arbitration clause
requiring that Appellant Gerald McCoy's ("McCoy" or "Plaintiff")
claims be submitted to arbitration.

Blue Cross appeals the trial

court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration.
Specifically,
1.

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's finding that

"Blue Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms. [Edwina] Green
as evidence that they mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr.
McCoy."

Findings, \ 6.

(R. 277).

In fact, Blue Cross

submitted, with the trial court's permission, Affidavits from two
other individuals and a Supplemental Affidavit of Edwina Green
showing the arbitration agreement was mailed.
2.

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's conclusion

that "Ms. Green's affidavit does not rise to the level of proof
of mailing."

Conclusions, \ 4.

(R. 278-279).

In fact, the

evidence of mailing was unrebutted.
3.

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's conclusion

that Blue Cross "failed to establish that Mr. McCoy's notice of
276434.2
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the arbitration amendment was ever mailed to him."
H 5.

Conclusions,

(R. 279). As noted, the evidence of mailing was

essentially unrebutted.
Blue Cross also appeals the trial court's failure to rule on
its argument that McCoy's failure to object to the arbitration
provision for approximately two years after he admitted becoming
aware of the provision constituted binding acceptance of its
terms.

(R. 233-234)
B.

Standcird of Review

Generally, "[a] trial court's denial of a motion to compel
arbitration presents a question of law which [is reviewed] for
correctness."

Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996).

Ordinarily, a trial court's findings of fact will be upheld
unless "clearly erroneous."

Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,

939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).

In this context, however, if the

trial court determined there was a disputed issue of fact, the
appropriate procedure was to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Buzas

Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 949 n.7 (Utah
1996).

No such hearing was held; instead, the trial court based

its decision on affidavits submitted by the parties.

Because the

trial court's ruling was based on Affidavits and other documents,
review is de novo.

In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918

(Utah App. 1988) ("Because the trial court's finding was based
solely on the written materials [affidavits] and involved no
assessment of witness credibility or competency, this court is in
as good a position as the trial court to examine the evidence de
i

novo
276434.2
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Giblin. 854 P.2d 816, 824 (Kan. 1993) (applying de novo standard
review where controlling facts of case are based upon written or
documentary evidence by way of pleadings, admissions, depositions
and stipulation, because trial court has no particular
opportunity to evaluate credibility of witnesses, and in such
situations, appellate court has as good an opportunity to examine
and consider evidence as trial court); Heskett v. Heskkett, 896
P.2d 1200, 1202 (Okl. App. 1995) (noting that when facts
presented to trial court by stipulation, deposition and other
documentary material, appellate court was free to substitute its
analysis of record for trial court's analysis); Stangler v.
Anderson Meyers Drilling Co., 746 P.2d 99, 101-102 (Mont. 1987)
(noting that where crucial testimony is taken by deposition, the
Supreme Court will examine findings more closely, as it is in as
good a position as lower court to assess evidence); Pena v.
Westland Dev. Co., Inc., 761 P.2d 438, 445, cert, denied 759 P.2d
200 (N.M. App. 1988) (noting that while ordinarily trial court is
proper arbitrator of credibility of witnesses and testimony,
where testimony is by deposition, appellate court may evaluate
testimony as well as trial court).
Fundamentally, the trial court's decision in this case was
based on a determination that Blue Cross had failed to meet its
burden of demonstrating mailing of the arbitration provision.
(R. 277-279).

That is a conclusion of law.

Accordingly, the

trial court's findings in this case, as well as its conclusions
of law, should be reviewed de novo.

In addition, review of these

issues must be conducted in light of the well established rule
276434.2
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that under Utah law all doubts are resolved in favor of
arbitration. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359.
C.
1.

Relevant Statutes

Section 3 of the Utah Arbitration Act provides:

A written agreement to submit any existing or future
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or
equity to set aside the agreement or when fraud is
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (1997).
2.

The Utah Insurance Code provides the following

regarding the right of an insurer to renew a policy:
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the
policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates,
the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to
the policy holder notice of the new terms or rates at
least 3 0 days prior to the expiration date of the prior
policy. If the insurer did not give this prior
notification to the policy holder, the new terms or
rates do not take effect until 30 days after the notice
is delivered or sent by first class mail, in which case
the policy holder may elect to cancel the renewal
policy at any time during the 3 0-day period.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994).
3.

The Utah Insurance Code provides the following

regarding the right of an insurer to modify a policy:
Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as
otherwise mandated by law no purported modification of
the contract during the term of the policy affects the
obligations of a party to the contract unless the
modification is in writing and agreed to by the party
against whose interest the modification operates.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).

276434.2
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VI.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration.

Plaintiff and Appellee Gerald McCoy ("McCoy or

"Plaintiff") claims that defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Utah ("Blue Cross" or "Defendant") refused coverage for treatment
of for his wife's breast cancer, in particular, a bone marrow
transplant, under a health insurance policy issued by Blue Cross.
Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint"), H1 7-14 (R. 4-5).
Blue Cross moved for arbitration, based upon language
contained in a number of documents.

(R. 17-29).

In particular,

Blue Cross presented evidence that in November of 1985 it sent
all individual policy holders a letter (the "First Mailing") and
an "Endorsement to Basic Health Care Agreement" (the
"Endorsement"), by submission of the Affidavit of Edwina H. Green
("Green I Affidavit") .

(R. 31, 34-36) .

The letter accompanying

the Endorsement read, in part:
We would also like to announce that effective January
1, 1986, we will adopt an arbitration procedure for the
resolution of any disputes you may have with Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Utah.
(R. 34). The Endorsement included the following arbitration
provision:
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach
of this Agreement arising between the Employer,
Subscriber, eligible Family Member, or the heir-at-law
or personal representative of such person, and the
Plan, whether involving a claim in tort, contract, or
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to the
arbitration under the appropriate rules of the American
Arbitration Association.

276434.2
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(R. 35).
Blue Cross also presented evidence that in early 1986, all
policy holders of individual health insurance policy Qualifier IType 57H were sent the new edition of the Health Care Agreement
(the "Second Mailing"), incorporating the terms of the
Endorsement into the existing policy (the "Amended Policy").
21, 32, 38-42).

(R.

The Amended Policy contains a binding

arbitration provision which states:
Binding arbitration is the final step for the
resolution of any dispute. When you enroll as a Member
of the Plan, you agree that any dispute will be
resolved by binding arbitration, and agree to give up
the right to a jury or court trial for a settlement of
such dispute . . . .
(R. 40). The Amended Policy also provides:
In the event of any dispute of controversy concerning
the . . . performance . . . of this Agreement arising
between the . . . Subscriber, eligible Family Member .
. . (and) the Plan, . . . the same shall be submitted
to arbitration under the appropriate rules of the
American Arbitration Association.
(R. 41). Finally, in 1990 a 1989 reprint of the Health Care
Agreement Qualifier I - Type 57H policy, also containing
arbitration language (collectively, with the Amended Policy, the
"Amended Policies"), was sent to policyholders by mail (the
"Third Mailing").

(R. 22, 32, 44-47A).

Collectively or

separately, the statements in the Endorsement and Amended
Policies (the "Arbitration Provisions") called for arbitration of
all disputes arising between McCoy and Blue Cross. (R. 4-5).
Plaintiff did not contest the scope of the Arbitration
Provisions.

Instead, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that

276434.2
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he did not receive any of the First, Second, or Third Mailings.
(R. 61, 64-68, 81).
The trial court ordered supplemental briefing on, among
others, the issues of notice to the McCoys and "whether or not
plaintiff waived objection to arbitration after notice was
received by plaintiff (in Jan., 1995)."

(R. 228). After

supplemental briefing, the trial court denied the motion to
compel arbitration, ruling only on the issue of whether Blue
Cross proved the Arbitration Provisions were mailed to the
McCoys.

This appeal followed.
B.

(R. 276-280, 281-283).

Course of Proceedings

Plaintiff sued Blue Cross, alleging that Blue Cross refused
coverage for treatment for his wife's breast cancer, in
particular, a bone marrow transplant, under a health insurance
policy issued by Blue Cross.
Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration as to all of these
claims.

(R. 17-47) . After detailed briefing by both parties (R.

60-87, 148-219, 230-268), the trial court denied Blue Cross's
Motion to Compel Arbitration, by Order entered on March 5, 1998,
and captioned "Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order"
(appellant will refer to the trial court's findings of fact as
"Findings," the trial court's conclusions of law as "Conclusions"
and the March 5, 1998 Order generally as the "Order"). (R. 276280).

The Notice of Appeal was filed March 11, 1998.

283) .

276434.2
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(R. 281-

C.

Disposition in the Trial Court

The district court denied Blue Cross's Motion to Compel
arbitration.

(R.

276-280) . Blue Cross filed this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-31a-19(1).
VII,

(R. 281-83).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Blue Cross principally appeals two aspects of the trial
court's ruling denying its motion to compel arbitration.

First,

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's ruling that Blue Cross did
not demonstrate that the Arbitration Provisions were mailed to
the McCoys.
In fact, the unrebutted evidence demonstrates that Blue
Cross proved the McCoys were mailed the Arbitration Provisions.
Blue Cross submitted an Affidavit of Edwina Green ("Green I
Affidavit"), and additional affidavits from Keith Stoddard (the
"Stoddard Affidavit") and Gary Nelson (the "Nelson Affidavit") as
evidence the First Mailing was sent to Mr. McCoy.
249-253).

(R. 237-241,

In addition, Blue Cross submitted a Supplemental

Affidavit of Edwina Green ("Green II Affidavit").

(R. 242-248).

The Green II Affidavit specifically set forth the process by
which Plaintiff was sent the First Mailing, under either of the
two possible subscriber groups the McCoys could have been part of
at the time of mailing.
245).

Green II Affidavit, UK 6-14 (R. 244-

Thus, the McCoys7 name and address would have been

contained on the magnetic tape sent to the printer.
Affidavit, HH 5-9 (R. 243-244) .

Green II

The Stoddard Affidavit

established that in the ordinary course of its business, Image
Printing (the "Printer") received this magnetic tape from Blue

276434.2
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Cross and inserted all of the names thereon into the First
Mailing.

Stoddard Affidavit, 11 6-9 (R. 238-239) .

Similarly,

the Nelson Affidavit established that in the ordinary course of
its business, Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (the "Mailer")
received the First Mailing from the Printer, and delivered the
mailing to the United States Postal Service.

Nelson Affidavit,

11 6-9 (R. 250-252).
Under Utah law, amendment to the policy and notice by
mailing -- when such notice has been agreed to by contract - - i s
valid and enforceable.

Diamond T. Utah, Inc. v. Canal Insurance

Company, 361 P.2d 665 (Utah 1961); Bennett Motor Company v. Lyon,
380 P.2d 69 (Utah 1963) . And, Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins.
Co., 851 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1993), held that, on facts nearly
identical to those here, a mere denial of receipt is insufficient
to defeat evidence that the insurer followed its standard mailing
practice.
Second, Blue Cross also appeals the trial court's implicit
rejection of the argument that Plaintiff's retention of the
policy for two years after he was admittedly aware of the
arbitration provision constituted a waiver of his right to
object.

The District Court for the Central District of Utah,

Judge Winder presiding, has ruled that an insured's retention of
an insurance policy for an extended period of time, without
objection within a reasonable time, "constitutes an acceptance of
the Policy, including the arbitration provision."

Imperial Sav.

Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (D. Utah 1990); see also
Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47 (N.M.
276434.2
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1968) (same); Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,
457 P.2d 558 (Okla. 1969) (same).

In Imperial Savings, Judge

Winder determined that an insured's retention of the policy in
question for only eleven months was sufficiently long to
constitute an unreasonably long period of time without objection.
Id.

In this case, McCoy's failure to state his objection for at

least two years, after he was admittedly on notice of the
arbitration provision, constitutes waiver of any right to object
to the inclusion of that arbitration provision in his insurance
policy.

McCoy is therefore required to arbitrate any disputes

over coverage under the Policy.
VIII.

ARGUMENT

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's ruling denying its
motion to compel arbitration.

The unrebutted evidence

demonstrates that Blue Cross proved the McCoys were mailed the
Arbitration Provisions.

Blue Cross also appeals the trial

court's implicit rejection of the argument that Plaintiff's
retention of the policy for two years after he was admittedly
aware Of the arbitration provision constituted a waiver of his
right to object.
A.

Background - Factual Record1

In the Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint"), Plaintiff
Gerald McCoy ("McCoy" or "Plaintiff") claimed that defendant Blue

1

Although Appellant does not believe it necessary to marshall
the evidence on appeal because the issue is whether to grant a
motion to compel arbitration (which is favored under Utah law),
this section also serves to marshall all the evidence presented
to the trial court on the relevant issues.
276434.2
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Cross and Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue Cross" or "Defendant")
improperly refused coverage for treatment for his wife's breast
cancer, in particular, a bone marrow transplant, under a health
insurance policy issued by Blue Cross.
5).

Complaint, UK 7-14 (R. 4-

Specifically, McCoy alleged claims arising out of his

purchase of a Blue Cross "Qualifier One" policy of health
insurance (the "Policy") through Blue Cross, effective on October
3, 1985. Complaint, 1 3 (R. 3).
Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration, based upon language
contained in the Policy since January, 1986. (R. 17-29).

In

particular, Blue Cross presented evidence that it sent all
individual policy holders a letter and an "Endorsement to Basic
Health Care Agreement" (the "Endorsement") in November of 1985
(the "First Mailing"), by submission of the Affidavit of Edwina
H. Green ("Green I Affidavit").

(R. 31, 34-36).

The letter

accompanying the Endorsement read, in part:
We would also like to announce that effective January
1, 1986, we will adopt an arbitration procedure for the
resolution of any disputes you may have with Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Utah.
(R. 34). The Endorsement included the following arbitration
provision:
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach
of this Agreement arising between the Employer,
Subscriber, eligible Family Member, or the heir-at-law
or personal representative of such person, and the
Plan, whether involving a claim in tort, contract, or
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to the
arbitration under the appropriate rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
276434.2

H
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R. 35).
Blue Cross also presented evidence, also through the Green I
Affidavit, that in early 1986, all policy holders of individual
health insurance policy Qualifier I-Type 57H were sent the new
edition of the Health Care Agreement (the "Second Mailing"),
incorporating the terms of the Endorsement (the "Amended
Policy") .

(R. 21, 32, 38-42) . The Amended Policy contains a

binding arbitration provision which states:
Binding arbitration is the final step for the
resolution of any dispute. When you enroll as a Member
of the Plan, you agree that any dispute will be
resolved by binding arbitration, and agree to give up
the right to a jury or court trial for a settlement of
such dispute . . . .
(R. 40). The Amended Policy also provides:
In the event of any dispute of controversy concerning
the . . . performance . . . of this Agreement arising
between the . . . Subscriber, eligible Family Member .
. . (and) the Plan, . . . the same shall be submitted
to arbitration under the appropriate rules of the
American Arbitration Association.
(R. 41). Finally, Blue Cross presented evidence through the
Green I Affidavit that, in 1990, a 1989 reprint of the Health
Care Agreement Qualifier I - Type 57H policy, also containing
arbitration language (collectively, with the Amended Policy, the
"Amended Policies"), was distributed to policyholders by mail
(the "Third Mailing") .

(R. 22, 32, 44-47A).

Collectively or

separately, the statements in the Endorsement and Amended
Policies (the "Arbitration Provisions") called for arbitration of
all disputes arising between the McCoys and Blue Cross.

276434.2

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff responded by arguing, among other things, that he
did not receive any of the First, Second or Third Mailings, (R.
61, 64-68, 81), by filing the Affidavit of Gerald McCoy ("McCoy I
Affidavit") .

(R. 79-85) .

The relevant portions of the McCoy I

Affidavit follow:
5.
I was a senior contract manager on the TransAlaska pipeline and have reviewed and managed other
contracts professionally. As a businessman involved in
the formation and administration of contracts, I am
aware of the importance of documenting changes in
contracts and the importance of record keeping.
6.
My wife, Frieda McCoy, was librarian and was
also aware of the importance of record keeping.
7.
My wife and I kept all documents and
correspondence we received from Blue Cross relating to
the Qualified I plan.
8.
I have reviewed my records and have not found
a copy of the November 25, 1985, letter and endorsement
attached to the Affidavit of Edwina H. Green dated May
27, 1997, as Exhibit A, nor have I found copies of the
Health Care Agreements portions of which are attached
to Ms. Green's affidavit as exhibits B and C.
9.
I do not recall ever having received copies
of any of the attachments to Ms. Green's affidavit at
any time before January 1995, nor do I recall ever
having received any other copy of the policy between
November 1985 and January 1995. Because of my work in
contracts, I believe I would remember if I had received
a copy of the endorsement attached as exhibit A to Ms,
Green's affidavit.
(R. 80-81).
In addition, Plaintiff admitted he was on notice of the
arbitration provision by at least January, 1995:
10. To the best of my knowledge, I never received
notice of the arbitration requirement that Blue Cross
alleges was added to the policy effective January 1,
1986, until some time in January 1995.
276434.2
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(R. 81) (emphasis added).

McCoy also admitted being placed on

notice of the existence of arbitration language much earlier.
In addition, McCoy admitted that since at least 1994, when
the McCoys received medical seirvices, they were sent an
Explanation of Benefits ("EOB") form.

(R. 84).

Plaintiff

himself presented evidence to the trial court that the EOB forms
sent to (and received by) the McCoys provided on the front of the
form:

If you disagree with our decision on your claim, you
may ask us to reconsider. You also have the right to
arbitration.
And provided on the back of the form:
If you are dissatisfied with the decision following
review, you may have the right to have the matter
arbitrated in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
EOB, attached as Exhibit 12 to McCoy I Affidavit (R. 135-136)
(emphasis added).

Plaintiff contended he did not read these

words, and would not have understood this language to require
arbitration.

(R. 84).

After Blue Cross replied to Plaintiff's arguments, (R. 148215), and argument was held (R. 228), the trial court ordered
supplemental briefing on, among others, the issues of notice to
the Plaintiff of the arbitration provisions, and "whether or not
plaintiff waived objection to arbitration after notice was
received by plaintiff (in Jan., 1995)."

276434.2
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Blue Cross submitted, pursuant to the Court's order,
additional affidavits from Keith Stoddard (the "Stoddard
Affidavit") and Gary Nelson (the "Nelson Affidavit") as evidence
the First Mailing was received by Mr. McCoy.
253).

(R. 237-241, 249-

In addition, Blue Cross submitted a Supplemental Affidavit

of Edwina Green ("Green II Affidavit").

(R. 242-248).

As discussed in detail below, the Green II Affidavit
specifically set forth the process by which Plaintiff was sent
the First Mailing, under both of the two possible subscriber
groups the McCoys would have been part of at the time of mailing.
Green II Affidavit, 11 6-14 (R. 244-245).

Thus, the McCoys' name

and address would have been contained on the magnetic tape sent
to the printer.

Green II Affidavit, 11 5-9 (R. 244-245).

The

Stoddard Affidavit established that in the ordinary course of its
business, Image Printing (the "Printer") received this magnetic
tape from Blue Cross and inserted all of the names thereon into
the First Mailing.

Stoddard Affidavit, 11 6-9 (R. 238-239).

Similarly, the Nelson Affidavit established that in the ordinary
course of its business, Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (the
"Mailer") received the First Mailing from the Printer, and
delivered the mailing to the United States Postal Service.
Nelson Affidavit, 11 6-9 (R. 250-252).
Plaintiff submitted the Supplemental Affidavit of Gerald
McCoy ("McCoy II Affidavit") wherein he contended, for the first
time, that when he admittedly learned of his right to arbitration

276434.2
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in January, 1995, he understood it as optional, not mandatory.
McCoy II Affidavit, H

2-5 (R. 265-66).

The trial court issued its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order" on February 26, 1998.

The trial court ruled that

Blue Cross did not establish that the arbitration provisions were
mailed to the McCoys, ruling, in relevant part, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT

6.
Blue Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms.
Green as evidence that they mailed an arbitration
amendment to Mr. McCoy.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4.
Ms. Green's affidavit: does not rise to the level of
proof of mailing. Ms. Green's affidavit cannot say whether
or not Mr. McCoy's name and address were actually on the
tape, an important fact in determining whether or not Mr.
McCoy's arbitration amendment was ever mailed.
5.
Blue Cross has failed to establish that Mr.
McCoy's notice of arbitration amendment was ever mailed
to him. Consequently, Blue Cross cannot apply the
arbitration amendment to him.
(R.276-279).

As discussed below, Blue Cross appeals the trial

court's Findings, Conclusions, and Order.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Its Ruling That the McCoys
Did Not Agree to the Arbitration Provisions
1.

Blue Cross Did Not Rely Solely on the Green I
Affidavit as Evidence the Arbitration Agreement
Was Mailed to the McCoys

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's finding that "Blue
Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms. [Edwina] Green as
276434.2

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence that they mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr. McCoy."
Findings, % 6 (R. 277) (emphasis added).

In fact, Blue Cross

submitted Affidavits from two other individuals, the Stoddard
Affidavit and the Nelson Affidavit, as evidence the First Mailing
was received by Mr. McCoy.

(R. 237-241, 249-253).

Blue Cross submitted the Green II Affidavit.

In addition,

(R. 242-248).

It

is apparent, therefore, that the trial court not only erred in
finding that Blue Cross relied "solely" upon the Green I
Affidavit, but that the trial court also improperly failed to
consider the contents of the Green II Affidavit, and the Stoddard
and Nelson Affidavits.

The specific evidence presented by these

affidavits is discussed below.
2.

The Supplemental Affidavits Established Proof of
Mailing the Arbitration Provisions

Blue Cross appeals the trial court's conclusion that "Ms.
Green's affidavit does not rise to the level of proof of
mailing."

Conclusions, % 4 (R. 278-279).

Blue Cross also

appeals the trial court's conclusion that it "failed to establish
that Mr. McCoy's notice of the arbitration amendment was ever
mailed to him."

Conclusions, H 5 (R. 279). A review of all the

affidavits submitted demonstrates that Blue Cross met its burden
of proof.

And, the evidence regarding mailing was unrebutted.

Contrary to the trial court's rulings, the Green I Affidavit
established that, at the direction of Ms. Green:
the programming department of [Blue Cross] prepared a
tape of all subscribers who were to receive the [First
Mailing]. The tape containing the subscriber list was
276434.2
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forwarded to Image Printing of Salt Lake City during
the week of November 11, 1985. Image Printing printed
the subscriber letter and inserted each subscriber's
name and address on Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah
letterhead. The completed letter, with the endorsement
prepared by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah was then
forwarded to Progressive Direct Mail Advertising of
Salt Lake City for mailing.
Green I Affidavit, f 4 (R. 31) (emphasis added); see also Green
II Affidavit, f 5 (R. 243) (same).

The Green II Affidavit

specifically detailed the process by which Plaintiff was sent the
First Mailing, under either of two policies the McCoys could have
been covered by at the time of mailing:
6.
According to BCBSU's current records, on or about
October 1, 1985, Mr. McCoy's name was input into
BCBSU's system as a subscriber to a 1GE plan, which is
a group plan.
7.
Approximately one week later, Mr. McCoy's
insurance was converted to the above-mentioned 57H nongroup individual contract.
8.
On or about November 11, 1985, a magnetic tape
was made that would have included Mr. McCoy, since he
was then carried on the BCBSU system as a subscriber
under 57H non-group, individual contract, and all such
subscribers were included on the magnetic tape.
9.
In addition, also included on the magnetic tape
were all subscribers under the 1GE group plan of which
Mr. McCoy had been a subscriber for approximately two
weeks. Thus, even if Mr. McCoy's membership had not
yet been transferred to the 57H non-group individual
contract subscribers, he would still have been included
in the mailing by virtue of his having been a member of
the 1GE group plan because that particular group plan
was included in the mailing.
Green II Affidavit, H

6-9 (R. 244-245) (emphasis added)

Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Green "cannot
say" whether the McCoys' name and address was included on the

276434.2
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tape is clearly in error; the clear preponderance of evidence is
that it would have been on the magnetic tape.

(R. 244-245).

Further, Blue Cross showed that the tape was then used to
mail the printed amendments:
10. On or about November 14, 1965, the magnetic tape
was sent to Image Printing ("Image") for printing of
the subscribers' names and addresses on the cover
letter to the amendment endorsement.
11. In addition, at the time the foregoing magnetic
tape was sent to Image for preparation of the mailing
materials, Mr. McCoy's name and address had not been
removed from the list of names and addresses on the
magnetic tape.
12. After Image printed the mailing materials, it
forwarded those materials to Progressive Direct Mail
Advertising ("Progressive") for the insertion of the
materials into envelopes and the actual mailing of the
materials.
13. After sending the mailing materials to Image, I
received confirmation from Image that Progressive had
completed the bulk mailing of 30,356 pieces of mail on
November 25, 1985.
14. I also received confirmation from Image, in the
form of an invoice date December 6, 1985, that
Progressive had mailed 30,356 pieces of mail to BCBSU
subscribers.
Green II Affidavit, UK 10-14 (R. 244-245).

The Stoddard

Affidavit established that in the ordinary course of its
business, Image Printing (the "Printer") received the magnetic
tape from Blue Cross, and inserted all of the names thereon into
the First Mailing.

Stoddard Affidavit, H

6-9 (R. 238-239).

Similarly, the Nelson Affidavit established that in the ordinary
course of its business, Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (the
"Mailer") received the mailing from the Printer, and delivered
276434.2
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the mailing to the United States Postal Service.
Affidavit, KK 6-9

(R. 250-252).

Nelson

In addition, the Green I

Affidavit established that the McCoys were sent the Second
Mailing and Third Mailing, containing the Amended Policies, as
policyholders.

Green I Affidavit, f 7 (R. 22, 32, 44-47A ) .

The evidence of mailing was unrebutted.

Mr. McCoy has never

offered any evidence that the Arbitration Provisions were not
mailed.

Instead, he only argues that he did not receive any of

the First, Second or Third Mailings.

This is insufficient under

Utah Law, which requires only proof that the Arbitration
Provisions were mailed, as explained in the next section.
3.

Even if True, the Fact That Mr. McCoy Did Not
Receive the First, Second, or Third Mailings is
Irrelevant; Proof of Mailing is Enough

As noted, Plaintiff's response to Blue Cross was that he did
not receive the mailing.

However, the issue is not whether Mr.

McCoy received any of the mailings, but whether the Arbitration
Provisions were mailed.

Under the terms of the Policy -- the

same document Mr. McCoy admits he received ("Complaint, f 3 (R.
3)) - - M r . McCoy agreed the terms of the Policy could be amended
by mailing -- not receipt.

And, under Utah law, Blue Cross had

the explicit right to modify the policy by mail.

The second

issue is addressed first.
The McCoys agreed, under the terms of the Policy (and the
Amended Policies) that notice by mail was acceptable.

In

addition, Plaintiff agreed, under the terms of the Policy (and

276434.2
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the Amended Policies), that Blue Cross had the "absolute right"
to modify the Policy upon such notice.
Specifically, under the Policy, Plaintiff agreed that the
terms of riders duly issued by Blue Cross became part of the
agreement between Plaintiff and Blue Cross:
"Agreement" means this document and attached riders
when duly issued by the Plan, the Subscriber's
Identification Card issued in connection with this
document, the Subscriber's health statement, and the
Subscriber's application in any supplemental
applications to the Plan for healthcare benefits
hereunder.
Policy, p. 23 (R. 150, 195) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff

Under the Policy,

agreed to abide by any modification of the terms of

the Policy upon written notice:
D. MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT
The Plan shall at all times have the absolute right to
modify or amend this Agreement from time to time;
provided, however, that no such modification or
amendment shall be effective until thirty (30) days
after written notice thereof has been given to the
Subscriber.
Policy, p. 36 (R. 202) (emphasis added).
Finally, under the Policy, Plaintiff agreed that notice as
provided for in the Policy would be deemed given and received
once placed in the mail:
Notices. Any notice to the Subscriber provided for in
this Agreement shall be deemed to have been given to
and received by the Subscriber when deposited in the
United States Mail with first class postage prepaid and
addressed to the Subscriber at the address shown in the
records of the Plan.
Policy, p. 42 (R. 205) (emphasis added).

276434.2
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that where parties to a
contract agree to notice by mail, actual notice is not required
to enforce the terms of the agreement.

In Diamond T. Utah, Inc.

v. Canal Insurance Company, 361 P.2d 665 (Utah 1961), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a provision in an
insurance policy which provided that "The mailing of notice as
aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice."

Id. at 667.

The

Diamond T Court upheld the provision, reasoning as follows:
The foregoing provision, known in the insurance
trade as a "standard cancellation clause," has been the
subject of many court decisions. The majority of these
decisions, under what we believe to be the best
reasoning, hold that the actual receipt of the
cancellation notice by the insured is not a condition
precedent to the cancellation of the insurance by the
insurer, provided the cancellation notice itself
contains a fixed date on which the cancellation is to
become effective. The rationale of these decisions is
that the express terms of the contract uphold the
sufficiency of a notice deposited in the mail, and that
such provision, being unambiguous, must be enforced as
written.
Id. (emphasis added); see also, Bennett Motor Company v. Lyon,
380 P.2d 69, 71 (Utah 1963) (citing Diamond T and observing "The
policy itself contained what is known as a 'standard cancellation
clause7 in which it was provided the mailing of notice would be
sufficient notice.

Such provisions have been recognized.11).

This rule was followed by the Utah Court of Appeals as recently
as 1993.2

See Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d

2

And, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Diamond T,
sufficiency of notice by mail is the majority rule. See, e.g.,
Bell v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 816 P.2d 407, 409 (Kan. App.
(continued...)
276434.2
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647, 651-52 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993)
(citing and following Diamond T ) .
Plaintiff also argued below that he did not agree to
modification of the original Policy to include an arbitration
provision, citing a provision of the Utah Insurance Code for the
proposition that Blue Cross could not modify the Policy during
its term (R. 65):
Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as
otherwise mandated by law no purported modification of
the contract during the term of the policy affects the
obligations of a party to the contract unless the
modification is in writing and agreed to by the party
against whose interest the modification operates.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
However, Section 31A-21-106(2) (entitled "Incorporation by
reference") states only that modification of an insurance policy
must be in writing (not that Plaintiff's agreement to the
modification be in writing) and that Plaintiff must have "agreed"
to the modification.

The statute does not, however, require

2

(...continued)
1991) (holding that where policy provided that "proof of mailing
of any notice shall be sufficient proof of notice," "[n]either
statute nor public policy requires the [insured] to have actually
received the mailed notice of cancellation.11); Ouintana v. Tenn.
Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co., 774 S.W. 2d 630, 633 (Tenn. App. 1989)
("A majority of the courts construing similar clauses have held
the insured need not actually receive the notice in order for the
cancellation to be effective."); Har-Con Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 757 S.W. 2d 153, 154 (Tex. App. 1988) ("Where the
parties have contracted as to the terms of cancellation of an
^insurance policy, and have expressly agreed that mailing of
N
notice shall suffice for proof of notice of cancellation, the
cancellation is effective upon the mailing of notice, even if the
addressee never actually receives the notice.").
276434.2
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Plaintiff's agreement to take any particular form or be at any
particular time.

It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff was on

notice that the Policy had been modified, by at least January of
1995, and probably earlier becaiuse he received EOB forms
expressly referencing the right to arbitrate.

As noted,

Plaintiff agreed even further in advance that his agreement would
become effective upon mailing of notice.
Furthermore, the Policy was not, as Plaintiff contended,
modified during its term.

Premiums on the McCoys' policy were

due each quarter, and this modification was made effective at the
end of its quarterly coverage.

(R. 31, 34-35, 39) . Notice by

mail is explicitly allowed by the Insurance Code at the time of
renewal, if rates increase or the policy is renewed on "less
favorable terms"3:
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the
policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates,
3

Blue Cross does not agree that an arbitration provision
is a "less favorable" term. In fact, Utah courts have ruled that
arbitration is favored for over a century. See, e.g. Buzas
Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996)
(fl[T]he Utah Arbitration Act "'reflects long-standing public
policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating
disputes.'") (citation omitted); Robinson & Wells, P.C. v.
Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983) ("The Territory and State
of Utah have had statutory provisions for arbitration of disputes
since 1884."); Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353,
356 (Utah 1932) ("Arbitration is favored in the law . . . . " ) .
In fact, arbitration grants Plaintiff the right to compel
arbitration against Blue Cross, creating a mutually beneficial
and reciprocal right in each of the parties, to the mutual
benefit of each party. The mutual right to arbitrate is, in
fact, ordinarily of significant benefit to an insured, who often
does not have the financial resources to wage a traditional
protracted legal battle against an insurance company.
276434.2
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the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to
the policy holder notice of the new terms or rates at
least 3 0 days prior to the expiration date of the prior
policy. If the insurer did not give this prior
notification to the policy holder, the new terms or
rates do not take effect until 30 days after the notice
is delivered or sent by first class mail, in which case
the policy holder may elect to cancel the renewal
policy at any time during the 3 0-day period.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 4
Under Utah law, the Insurance Code specifically states that the
new terms are effective if notice is given by first class mail.
Again, as under the specific terms of the Policy, there is no
requirement of actual notice.
Plaintiff cannot now, more than ten years after agreeing to
the terms of the Policy allowing modification and notice by mail,
contend that he is not bound by the very terms of the document he
4

Numerous courts have enforced similar statutes, holding
that actual receipt is not required under these circumstances.
See, e.g. Atlanta Cas. Co, v Sweeney, 868 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark.
1994) ("Whether the notice was received by [the insured] is
irrelevant according to the statute, as "proof of mailing' is
'sufficient proof of notice.'"): Balboa Ins. Co. v Hunter, 299
S.E.2d 91, 92 (Ga. App. 1983) (holding that under statute
allowing written notice to be delivered "by depositing such
notice in the United States Mail" meant that "actual receipt of
the notice is not necessary to effect cancellation if the notice
of cancellation properly addressed and stamped for first class
delivery was delivered to the postal authorities and a receipt
obtained therefore."): Hemperly v Edna Casp. & Sur. Co., 516
So.2d 1202, 1204 (La. App. 1987) (holding that under Louisiana
statute, "[p]roof of mailing, notice of cancellation to the named
insured of the address shown on the policy shall be sufficient
proof of notice. Proof of receipt of that notice is not
required."): Isaacson v DeMartin Agency, Inc., 893 P.2d 1123,
1125 (Wash. App. 1995) ("Although [the insured] stated she did
not receive a cancellation notice an insurer is not required to
prove actual receipt if statutory mailing procedures are
followed.").
276434.2
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is purportedly attempting to enforce.

Plaintiff agreed by

contract5 to certain procedures, and the law in the state of
Utah at all times has held these procedures to be acceptable and
controlling of the issues here.
4.

Blue Cross Presented Sufficient Proof of Mailing

In essence, the trial court ruled that the evidence provided
by Blue Cross, that the McCoys' name and address was in the
computerized database, and that their name and address was placed
on a magnetic tape, and that the magnetic tape was used to
generate the First Mailing, and the other evidence offered, was
insufficient to prove the Arbitration Provisions were mailed to
the McCoys.

See Order (R. 276-279)

By rejecting Blue Cross' proof on this issue, in the face of
nothing more than Plaintiff's failure to recall that any of the
three mailings were received, the trial court effectively
converted the requirement of proof of mailing into one of proof
of receipt.

In contracts allowing change by mailing, under Utah

law, "receipt . . . by the insured is not a condition precedent"
5

The rational of Diamond T, that the parties are bound by
the explicit terms of their contract, remains the rule under the
current Insurance Code. The Utah Supreme Court in Allen v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992),
considered "the legislative policy underlying the Insurance
Code," stating that the Code expresses an intent that "freedom of
contract" be maintained, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(7), and that
written contracts be the primary means by which this freedom to
contract be exercised. See, e.g., id. §§ 31A-21-301 to -404
(1991 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth detailed provisions
authorizing and governing insurance contract clauses and setting
forth acceptable methods by which various clauses can be modified
by the parties). Jd. at 806.
276434.2
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to enforcement of the terms of the mailing.
at 667 (emphasis added).

Diamond T, 361 P.2d

Blue Cross is not required to show

proof of receipt, and the trial court erred in implicitly
imposing this requirement contrary to Utah law.

Service Fire

Ins. Co. v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1955) ("The policy
provision did not require mailing by registered mail and we can
not read such a requirement into the contract.").
In fact, under Utah law, the Affidavits submitted by Blue
Cross defeat McCoy's denial of receipt of the Arbitration
Agreements.

The Utah Court of Appeal addressed this identical

issue in Baumcrart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647
(Utah App. 1993).

In Baumgart, the policy at issue provided that

a cancellation notice "must be delivered or mailed by first class
mail."

id. at 651-52.

The insured challenged the cancellation,

presenting an affidavit "in which he claim[ed] he never actually
received the cancellation notice.

Id. at 652 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals specifically found that because the insurer
followed its "usual business procedure," and offered evidence
that the cancellation was mailed, the insured's denial of receipt
did not create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary
judgment:
Even given [the insured's] allegation that he
never received the cancellation notice, he only infers
that [the insurer! never mailed it. He offers no
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial" as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
56(e),

276434.2
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Id. at 652 (emphasis added) ; cf.. Bennett Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14
Utah 2d 161, 380 P.2d 69, 71-72 (Utah 1963) (holding insufficient
proof of mailing where insurer failed to show it had followed
routine office mailing practice).
In this case, it is undisputed that Blue Cross followed its
usual and routine mailing procedures to send the McCoys no less
than three mailings, each of which included an arbitration
provision.

As in Baumgart, the McCoys only challenge to this

proof is a self-serving denial that it was received.
Baumgart, a mere denial of receipt is insufficient.

As in
Accordingly,

Blue Cross produced sufficient proof to show proof of mailing.6
The obvious purpose of a contractual provision allowing
notice by mailing -- rather than receipt -- is to allow amendment
of the terms of a policy, held by thousands, through an efficient
and effective manner, at minimum cost.

The notice by mailing

provision, a valid and enforceable term of the contract, shifted
the risk to the policy holder that a mailing would not be
received.

The trial court's ruling deprived Blue Cross of this

contract benefit, specifically intended to avoid the very problem
in this case, and shifted risk of non-receipt (or failure to
recall receipt) back to Blue Cross.

6

Blue Cross notes the cancellation of a policy has much
greater adverse implication for an insured than an arbitration
provision. Even in the cancellation context, the Baumgart court
ruled that (1) notice by mailing was sufficient by the terms of
the policy; and (2) that the proof-of-mailing requirement was
met.
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The trial court's alternative, requiring Blue Cross (and,
implicitly, every other insurer in the State of Utah) to send all
mailings to insureds by certified mail or similar means, would
require delivery of literally hundreds of thousands of pieces of
certified mail every year.

Insurers would then be required to

hire an entire staff for the sole purpose of collecting,
compiling, reviewing the hundreds of thousands of certified mail
receipts from each mailing, and cross referencing them to be sure
each subscriber had acknowledged receipt.

And, the insurer would

be required to maintain these records indefinitely -- in this
case for over ten years.7

Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, cite

any authority requiring an insurer to deliver an arbitration
provision added to an insurance policy to the insured by
certified mail.8

7

Plaintiff was allegedly unaware of the existence of the
Arbitration Provisions for approximately nine years from the date
of the First Mailing. Specifically, it is undisputed that the
McCoys enrolled under the Policy on or about October 16, 1985,
and the Policy was amended in November of 1985, to become
effective on January 1, 1986. Despite the Second and Third
Mailings and the fact that Plaintiff's subsequent Explanation of
Benefits forms refer to the right to arbitration, Plaintiff
claims he did not discover this change until over nine years
later, in January of 1995. Memorandum in Opposition, Yl 1/ 6/ P2 (R. 61).
8

For service of papers, once personal service is obtained,
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require nothing more than
mailing to the "last known address" of a party or their attorney.
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). The Rules do not require proof of
receipt. Nor does the Utah common law require more of insurers.
Diamond-T, 361 P.2d at 667.
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C. The McCoys' Accepted the Arbitration Agreement by
Accepting the Blue Cross Policy for Over Two Years
The trial court also failed to rule on, and therefore
implicitly rejected, Blue Cross's argument that McCoy's failure
to object to the arbitration provision for approximately two
years after he became aware of the arbitration provision
constituted an acceptance of its terms.

(R. 233-234).

In this case, Mr. McCoy retained the Blue Cross policy for
over twelve years following the issuance of the Endorsement, and
two years following his admitted knowledge of the arbitration
clause before deciding it was time to object to the arbitration
clause.

Specifically, although McCoy admits to learning of the

arbitration provision in January of 1995, (see McCoy I Affidavit
at H 10) (R. 81), he did not object until Blue Cross moved to
compel arbitration, and he still remained a subscriber until
April 16, 1997.

See Green II Affidavit at \ 18 (R. 245). 9

McCoy had at least two years to review the arbitration provisions
of the policy and decide that he did not like the arbitration
provision.

9

In his second affidavit, Plaintiff contended that, as
with the arbitration language in the EOB, he did not understand
that the arbitration provision was mandatory and not optional.
(R. 266). However, Plaintiff does not, and cannot, dispute he
was on actual notice of the arbitration provision in January,
1995, and on constructive notice at least a year earlier from the
EOB forms. Under Judge Winder's decision in Imperial Savings,
infra, his continued retention of the policy and payment of
premiums for at least two years after notice constitutes waiver
of his right to object.
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Plaintiff's failure to object constitutes an acceptance of
the arbitration clause; it also belies his affidavit statement
that he "would have sought another health insurance policy that
did not require arbitration" had he known about the clause in his
Blue Cross contract.

See McCoy I Affidavit at *h 24 (R. 84-84).

Instead, McCoy decided to voice his objection only after BCBSU
attempted to have his dispute with it arbitrated, as McCoy's
policy clearly mandates.
The District Court for the Central District of Utah, Judge
Winder presiding, ruled that an insured's retention of an
insurance policy for an extended period of time, without
objection within a reasonable time, "constitutes an acceptance of
the Policy, including the arbitration provision."

Imperial Sav.

Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (D. Utah 1990); see also
Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47 (N.M.
1968) (same); Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,
457 P.2d 558 (Okla. 1969) (same).

In Imperial Savings, Judge

Winder determined that an insured's retention of the policy in
question for only eleven months was sufficiently long to
constitute an unreasonably long period of time without objection.
Id.
McCoy's failure to state his objection for at least two
years, after he was admittedly on notice of the arbitration
provision, constitutes waiver of any right to object to the
inclusion of that arbitration provision in his insurance policy.
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McCoy is therefore required to arbitrate any disputes over
coverage under the Policy.
D.

Plaintiff Does Not Contest the Application of
the Arbitration Provisions to the Claims.

As noted, Plaintiff did not contest that that scope of the
Arbitration

Provisions is broad enough to cover all claims

asserted in the Complaint.

(R. 27-28, 60-77).

As noted,

arbitration is favored, and if "the scope of an arbitration
clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause should be
construed in favor of arbitration . . . .nl° Lindon City v.
Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981) (citation
omitted).

Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court should

direct that all of the claims in the Complaint proceed in
arbitration.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The trial court erred when it found that Plaintiff was not
bound by the Arbitration Provisions, and declined to rule that
Plaintiff's acceptance of the Policy for two years after he
learned of the arbitration provision constituted a waiver.
10

Blue

Plaintiff also argued below that (1) assent to the
Arbitration Provisions was somehow procured by fraud, and (2)
that under the Utah Arbitration Act, an allegation of fraud in
the Complaint defeats arbitration. (R. 70-71; 74-75).
However, under controlling law, a mere allegation of fraud
as to the contract as a whole is insufficient to defeat
arbitration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395,
403-04 (1967). And, even were a general fraud allegation
sufficient to defeat arbitration, Plaintiff failed to allege
fraud with the requisite particularity. Educators Mutual
Insurance Association v. Allied Property and Casualty and
Insurance Company, 890 P. 2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1995).
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Cross has come forward with sufficient and unrebutted evidence
the Arbitration Provisions were mailed, and Plaintiff admits to
at least receiving notice of some references to arbitration.
Accordingly, Blue Cross is entitled to a reversal of the trial
court's order denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration on all
issues raised in the Complaint.
DATED this ? 5T^rday of October, \l$s[
i
JONES, WftLlpb, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Andrew H. Stone
James E. Magleby
Attorneys for Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

f^-r^

day of October, 1998,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANTSS BRIEF, to the following:
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg
David R. Olsen
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
f\

Clark Newhall
136 South Main,
Salt Lake City,
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